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THE INFLUENCE OF MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO
ON MODERN LEGAL AND POLITICAL IDEAS
M.N.S. Sellers

Marcus Tullius Cicero is the father of modern law and politics. 1 Cicero’s influence was
significant in the centuries following his death, 2 throughout the middle ages, 3 and during the
renaissance of European culture4, but never so much nor so directly as in the emergence of
modernity and in the development of modern law and constitutional government.5 Emergent
modernity differed from earlier (and subsequent) periods of European history in the depth of its
fidelity to Cicero. The early moderns became the most faithful apostles of Cicero’s thought and
ideals because their world and political circumstances were in many ways closer to those of Cicero
than those of any intervening centuries. The influence of Cicero’s legal and political ideas on the
modern world illustrates the decisive importance that the study of history can have on legal
1

For a collection of essays on Cicero’s influence on modern law, see Richard O. Brooks, ed.,
Cicero and Modern Law, to be published in 2009. For a broader study of Cicero’s influence
through the ages, see Thaddäus Zielinski, Cicero im Wandel der Jahrhunderte (Leipzig/Berlin, 4th
ed. 1929). See also Richard Tuck, “The “modern” theory of natural law” in Anthony Pagden, ed.
The Languages of Political Theory in Early-Modern Europe (Cambridge, 1987), pp. 99-119.
2
Even Augustus is said to have conceded that Cicero was a great orator and a great patriot
(Plutarch, Cicero, 49.) See Paul Mackendrick, The Philosophical Books of Cicero (New York,
1989) pp. 258ff. for Cicero’s posthumous reputation.
3
For a recent collection on this topic, see Virginia Cox and John O.Ward, The Rhetoric of Cicero in
its Medieval and Early Renaissance Commentary Tradition (Leiden, 2006) and also other chapters
in this present volume of the Colloquium Tullianum.
4
See Hans Baron, The Crisis of the Early Italian Renaissance: Civic Humanism and Republican
Liberty in an Age of Classicism and Tyranny (revised ed., Princeton, 1993). Cf. Remigio Sabbadini,
Storia del Ciceronianismo e di altri questioni letterarie nell’età della Rinascenza (Torino, 1885).
5
See M.N.S. Sellers, The Sacred Fire of Liberty: Republicanism, Liberalism and the Law
(Basingstoke, 1998). Cf. Charles Howard McIlwain, Constitutionalism Ancient and Modern
(revised ed. Ithaca, 1947); Martin van Gelderen and Quentin Skinner, eds. Republicanism and
Constitutionalism in Early Modern Europe: A Shared European Heritage (Cambridge, 2005).
1

innovation and social change.6 The modern world would not have developed where it did, when it
did, nor as it did were it not for the life and the writings of Marcus Tullius Cicero.7

1.

Ancients and Moderns

Modernity requires definition, and has developed slightly different connotations in the many
different fields which it has touched, 8 but the central and most important distinction between the
“modern” sensibility and other ways of thinking has been the modern appeal to reason against
arbitrary authority. 9 This attitude was also the distinguishing characteristic of Cicero as a
philosopher and as a lawyer. 10 Cicero identified the law with “recta ratio” (right reason”)11 and
justified all legal and political authority in terms of its service to the “res publica” or common good
of the people.12 Searching for the common good in this way is not uniquely modern. 13 Plato14 and

6

See M.N.S. Sellers, Republican Legal Theory: The History, Constitution and Purposes of Law in a
Free State (Basingstoke, 2003), pp. 102ff.
7
Carlyle drew the line between the ancient and the modern at Cicero. Robert W. Carlyle and
Alexander J. Carlyle, A History of Mediaevel Political Theory in the West (London, 1903), volume
I, pp.1-2. Cf. Robert Denoon Cumming, Human Nature and History (Chicago, 1969).
8
See e.g. Stephen E. Toulmin, Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity (Chicago, 1990);
Jürgen Habermas, Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures trans. Frederick G.
Lawrence (Cambridge, Mass., 1985); Jonathan I. Israel, Enlightenment Contested: Philosophy,
Modernity, and the Emancipation of Man, 1670-1752 (Oxford, 2006).
9
Immanuel Kant, Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung? (1784) in Was ist Aufklärung:
Ausgewählte Kleine Schriften, ed. E. Cassirer and H.D. Brandt (Hamburg, 1999).
10
See particularly M. Tullius Cicero, Academica; De legibus; De re publica; De natura deorum;
and De officiis. See also (among many others) J.G.F. Powell, ed., Cicero the Philosopher (Oxford,
1995); Neal Wood, Cicero’s Social and Political Thought (Berkeley, 1988); and Paul MacKendrick,
The Philosophical Books of Cicero (New York, 1989).
11
M.Tullius Cicero, De legibus, 1.6.18. Cf. Philippicae, II.28.
12
See e.g. M.Tullius Cicero, De re publica, I.25.39.
13
See e.g. Michael A. Smith, Human Dignity and the Common Good in the Aristotelian-Thomistic
Tradition (Lewiston, New York, 1995).
14
Plato, Politeia, I.15.342 E; Nomoi, IV.715 B.
2

Aristotle,15 had used similar vocabulary, and even Saint Augustine could accept and Christianize
many of Cicero’s definitions, 16 making them familiar throughout the middle ages. 17 Cicero’s views
were well known and respected for centuries, but they were also extremely corrosive to the
legitimacy of unchecked power. What modern lawyers most appreciated in Cicero was his
commitment to reason, his contempt for regnum, his lifelong battle against arbitrary authority, and
his desire to advance and protect the public welfare through constitutional reform. 18

“Ancient” and “modern” began as temporal terms, so that whatever is most recent is
“modern” in one sense, and will become “ancient” with the passage of time. 19 To speak of
“modernity” in a more timeless way, however, is to identify one of the great turning points of
history. At various times in various disciplines and to differing degrees between the twelfth and
eighteenth centuries (and to some extent before and afterwards) people began to order their lives,
beliefs, laws, and politics by considering reason and the public good, rather than the dictates of
religion, authority, power, or naked self-interest.20 Simply reciting this difference makes clear the
extent to which premodern attitudes are still very much present and perhaps growing in strength in

15

Aristoteles, Politica, III.4.7.
Augustinus De civitate Dei, II. 21.Cf. Cicero, De re publica II. 42.
17
See e.g. Hans Baron, “Cicero and the Roman Civic Spirit in the Middle Ages and Early
Renaissance” Bulletin of the John Rylands Library 22 (1938) pp. 72-97, revised in ibid., In Search
of Florentine Civic Humanism: Essays on the Transition from Medieval to Modern Political
Thought. (Princeton, 1988); John E. Sandys, A History of Classical Scholarship from the Sixth
Century B.C. to the End of the Middle Ages (Cambridge, 1903).
18
See e.g. John Adams, Defence of the Constitutions of Government of the United States of America
(London, 1787) in volume I, pp. xvi-xix.
19
The term “modernus” seems first to have emerged in the fourth century to distinguish the new
sensibility of the Christian era. Matei Calinescu, Five Faces of Modernity (2d ed. Charlotte, North
Carolina, 1987) pp. 14,41.
20
See Martin van Gelderen and Quentin Skinner, eds. Republicanism: A Shared European Heritage
2 Volumes (Cambridge, 2002).
16

3

the “postmodern” era.21 Separating “modernity” from its purely temporal definition makes it easier
to understand the extent to which the emergence of a “modern” sensibility required the revival of
“ancient” ideals. 22

“Ancient” and “modern” conceptions of law and government have much more in common
with each other than either does with thought in the centuries that separate them. The Florentine
Donato Giannotti repeated a commonly made distinction, when he mourned the destruction of
ancient conceptions of law and government, which sought the common good, at the hands of Caesar
and his successors, who pursued their own private interests.

23

James Harrington at the time of the

English Commonwealth 24 and John Adams, during the American Revolution, 25 repeated and
endorsed Giannotti’s famous observation and joined him in seeking to revive what they called
government “de jure” or “the empire of laws and not of men.”26

The “great question”, as modern

students of politics understood it, was “what combination of powers in society, or what form of
government, will compel the formation of good and equal laws, an impartial execution, and faithful
interpretation of them, so that citizens may constantly enjoy the benefit of them, and be sure of their
continuance.”27

21

The postmodern turn towards superstition, self-assertion and violence is often marked by a
recrudescence of citations to Friedrich Nietzsche.
22
Cf. Thomas Chaimowicz, Antiquity as Modernity: Freedom and Balance in the Thought of
Montesquieu and Burke (Edison, NJ, 2008). First published as Freiheit and Gleichgewicht im
Denken Montesquieus und Burkes (Vienna, 1985).
23
Donato Giannotti, Libro della repubblica de’ Viniziani (1540) in Opere I. p. 15. Cf. Tacitus,
Annali, I.1-2.
24
James Harrington, The Commonwealth of Oceana (1656) ed. J.G.A. Pocock (Cambridge, 1992)
pp. 8-9.
25
John Adams, A Defence of the Constitutions of Government of the United States of America
(London, 1787) at I.126.
26
Ibid.
27
Ibid. at I.128.
4

Leaping directly into the eighteenth century Enlightenment, in the person of John Adams,
may seem somewhat premature in a discussion of modernity, which had its beginnings centuries
earlier. The jump is justified because the French and American Revolutions were the most decisive
moments in the triumph of modern law, and its conquest of European institutions. 28 John Adams,
the author of Thoughts on Government (1776), of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts (1780) and of the Defence of the Constitutions of Government of United States of
America (1787-1788), reflected and institutionalized modern conceptions of law and government
constructed solely (as he believed) “by use of reason and the senses.”29 When Adams set out to list
the reading and the reasoning that produced the modern laws and constitutions of his era, 30 he began
with Cicero: “As all the ages of the world have not produced a greater statesmen and philosopher
united in the same character, his authority should have great weight.”31 Modernity arose from
imitation of the ancients, who seemed at first almost divine in their accomplishments, but true
modernity (in any field) develops only when moderns begin finally to surpass the ancients in
applying their reason to the world around them, and cease to depend so much on the ancient
predecessors who inspired their first (and many subsequent) steps towards modernity.

2.

Cicero on Law and Government

28

See R.R. Palmer, The Age of Democratic Revolution: A Political History of Europe and America,
1760-1800 (Princeton, 1959).
29
Adams, Defense, at I.xiii-xiv.
30
Ibid. at I.xv.
31
Ibid. at I.xvii.
5

Cicero defined the law as “right reason” (“recta ratio”) discerning what ought to be
done, and forbidding what is harmful. 32 He sought the sources of law and justice in nature 33 and in
the natural fellowship of humanity, 34 discovered in detail through the application of reason, which
should govern (and precedes) all positive enactments of the state. 35 This is in itself a revolutionary
doctrine, measuring positive law against the standard of justice, but Cicero went further, by trying
to discover the institutional arrangements that would best secure and perpetuate justice for the
people, through the structures of constitutional government. 36 Cicero’s six books on the republic
were lost, for the most part, until the nineteenth century, but fragments enough remained to reveal
how he had struggled to perfect the actual constitution of Rome, with artful checks and balances
between the powers and magistrates of the state.37

Cicero considered any true “republic” (“res publica”) to be the property of the people (“res
populi”), when the people band together to pursue shared justice and their common good. 38 States
exist to realize in fact the truths that philosophers try to capture in words. 39 This could be
attempted through various forms of government, but Cicero suggested that the most effective would

32

M. Tullius Cicero, De legibus, I.6.18 : “lex est ratio summa insita in natura, quae iubet ea, quae
facienda sunt, prohibetque contraria. Eadem ratio cum est in hominis mente confirmata et confecta,
lex est. itaque arbitrantur prudentiam esse legem, cuius ea vis sit, ut recte facere iubeat, vetet
delinquere.” Cf. Philippicae II.28: “est enim lex nihil aliud nisi recta et a numine deorum tracta ratio
imperans honesta, prohibens contraria.”
33
Ibid. at I.5.17.
34
Ibid. at I.5.16.
35
Ibid. at I.6.19.
36
Ibid at I.6.20.
37
For the influence of these fragments of Cicero’s De re publica, see John Adams, Defence of the
Constitutions of Government of the United States of America (London, 1787) at I. xvii-xix.
38
M. Tullius Cicero, De re publica, I.25.39: “res publica res populi, populus autem non omnis
hominum coetus quoquo modo congregatus, sed coetus multitudinis iuris consensu et utilitatis
communione sociatus.”
39
Ibid. at I.2.2.
6

be “mixed” (“moderatus et permixtus”), combining and balancing the best aspects of various public
institutions. 40 “Liberty” (“libertas”), for example, (“qua quidem nihil potest esse dulcius”) thrives
best in a state where the people have ultimate power,41 and all citizens have equal legal rights, 42
and the vote,43 but some decisions will still need to be made by experts, or by the expeditious
action of a single authority. 44 This balanced constitution (“constitutio”) will be more just, Cicero
suggested, but also more stable than other forms of government. 45

Cicero further endorsed certain very specific institutions, such as a congress (“comitia”) of
the people and a “senate” of leading men, 46 whose joint approval would be required to confirm the
laws. 47 These and other key elements of his ideal constitution maintained the careful balance of
rights, duties, and magistrates necessary to preserve the “republic” intact. 48 Cicero compared the
well-balanced constitution to harmony in music and sought to establish justice through the
measured reason of good institutions, similar to those which had developed over many generations
in Rome. 49 For Cicero the study of law and the institutions of justice was the highest form of

40

Ibid. at I.29.45. Cf. I.45.69.
Ibid.at I.31.47.
42
Ibid. at I.32.49.
43
Ibid. at I.34.51.
44
Ibid. at I.35.55.
45
Ibid. at I.45.69. Cf. ibid. II.23.41: “statu esse optimo constitutam rem publicam, quae ex tribus
generibus illis, regali et optumati et populari, confuse modice…”.
46
Ibid. at III.11.27-28.
47
Ibid at II.32.56.
48
On the importance of the magistrates, see ibid. at III. 5.12.
49
Ibid at II.33.57. Cf. II. 42.69: “ut enim in fidibus aut tibiis atque ut in cantu ipso ac vocibus
concentus est quidam tenendus ex distinctis sonis, quem in mutatum aut discrepantem aures
eruditae ferre non possunt, isque concentus ex dissimillimarum vocum moderatione concors tamen
efficitur et congruens, sic ex summis et infimis et mediis interiectis ordinibus ut sonis moderata
ratione civitas consensu dissimillorum concinit; et quae harmonia a musicis dicitur in cantu, ea est
in civitate concordia, artissimum atque optimum omni in re publica vinculum in columitatis, eaque
sine iustitia nullo pacto esse potest.”
41

7

science, 50 since law and justice concern all peoples and derive from nature, which is accessible to
anyone wise enough to contemplate and pursue the truth. 51

Taken to its logical conclusion, Cicero’s theory of just laws and republican government
condemned any unbalanced state as a “tyrrany” and worthy of revolution, 52 whether it was
dominated by a monarch, or some faction 53 or even by the people themselves. 54 If a good life is
only possible under balanced constitutional government, 55 then all governments should become
republics, 56 in deference to universal truth, 57 and nothing would be more foolish than to confuse
the positive laws of a bad government with binding law or justice. 58 Cicero asserted a universal
right to justice, received by all human beings directly from nature, rather than by any positive
enactment. 59 Reason gives us all the ability to think, discuss, argue about, and discover the truth
about justice, as about all other subjects of our senses and natural perceptions. 60 All people in all
nations everywhere have this capacity to reason, which Cicero calls the particular “virtue” of
humanity. 61

50

Ibid. III.3.4-5.
Ibid. III. 22.33: “Est quidem vera lex ratio naturae congruens, diffusa in omnes, constans,
sempiterna, quae vocet ad officium iubendo, vetando a fraude deterreat.” Cicero goes on to explain
that the foundations of law in human nature are valid for all nations and all times, and cannot be
repealed, even by positive enactment. Cf. I.15.42.
52
Ibid. at III. 31.43.
53
Ibid. at III.32.44.
54
Ibid. at III.33.45.
55
Ibid. at V.5.7.
56
Cf. ibid. VI. 13.13.
57
M. Tullius Cicero, De legibus I.4.14-5.15. Cf. Ibid I. 7.23.
58
Ibid. at I.15.42.
59
Ibid,. I.10. 28: “nihil est profecto praestabilius quam plane intellegi nos ad iustitiam esse natos,
neque opinione, set natura constitutum esse ius.”
60
Ibid. at I.10.30.
61
Ibid.: “nec est quisquam gentis ullius, qui ducem nactus ad virtutem pervenire non possit.” Cf.
I.12.33: “quibus enim ratio natura data est, isdem etiam recta ratio data est, ergo et lex, quae ex
51

8

If Cicero’s attitudes towards constitutional government, justice, and the laws would be
particularly important to modernity, his writings on duties have had a striking influence in every era
since they were written, almost to the present day. Private duties of justice and honesty are
applicable under tyrannies and theocracy, as much as they are in republics, and therefore less
threatening to the status quo. Yet Cicero’s famous volume de officiis shares the fundamental
assumptions of his other writings, and may have had a greater influence, even on modernity,
because of its wider circulation. Here too Cicero stressed the search for truth as fundamental to
every human endeavor, 62 and found the truth in laws derived from nature, for the general good,
which people have a natural duty to obey. 63 Thus duty, like law, arises from nature, and the needs
of human society, 64and virtue consists in seeking out and performing what truth, justice and reason
require65 of us, as participants in the universal society of mankind. 66

3.

Pre-modern Attitudes Towards Cicero
Cicero’s authority much preceded modernity, which makes it important to distinguish the

“modern” interest in Cicero from that of his earlier admirers. European recourse to Cicero became
“modern” when Europeans turned from imitating Cicero’s rhetoric and style to considering his

recta ratio in iubendo et vetando; si lex, ius quoque; et omnibus ratio; ius igitur datum est omnibus.”
Cf. also I. 16.45: “est enim virtus perfecta ratio, quod certe in natura est.”
62
M. Tullius Cicero, De officiis, I.4.13: “in primisque hominis est propria veri inquisitio atque
investigatio.”
63
Ibid.: “utilitatis causa iuste et legitime imperandi.”
64
Ibid. at I.5.15.
65
Ibid. at I.5.17. Cf. III. 17.72.
66
M. Tullius Cicero, De officiis, III.17.69. Cf. De legibus, I.7.23.
9

views on religion, law and politics. 67 Where Europeans once accepted Tacitus’ view that the
checks and balances of republican law and government, while desirable, are fleeting and almost
impossible to maintain, 68 they later came gradually to share Cicero’s optimism that reason (“ratio”)
could find the right measure of checks and balances in government to achieve justice (“iustitia”)
and harmony (“harmonia”) in public life.69 John Adams made explicit reference to both authors
(and to the passages cited above) when he asserted his nation’s renewed commitment to reason, to
political science, and to a judicious balance of public powers,70 as capable of securing “the public
interest, which is common right and justice.” 71

The full text of Cicero’s dialogue on the republic was lost to modern authors, so it is striking
how often they quote his most famous passages. Most of the excerpts from Cicero repeated by John
Adams were fragments salvaged from the works of Saint Augustine,72 who wrote his immensely
influential treatise on the City of God largely to counter contemporary “pagani”, who blamed
Christianity for the weakness, decline, and ultimate sack of Rome.73 Augustine replied that wordly
affairs had been a lost cause from the start.74 This led him into an elaborate digression on Cicero,
who had seen Rome’s republic fail four centuries before the calamities that troubled Augustine’s
contemporaries (and well before the birth of Christ). 75

67

On Cicero’s influence in European rhetoric, see Thomas M. Conley, Rhetoric in the European
Tradition (Chicago, 1994), pp. 34ff.
68
Cornelius Tacitus, Annali, 4.33.
69
M. Tullius Cicero, De re publica, 2.42.
70
Adams Defence, at I. i-ii and xvi-xviii, also citing Cicero, De re publica, 2.23.
71
Adams, op. cit., at I.127.
72
See particularly his Defence of the Constitutions of Government of the United States of America
(London, 1787) in the preface.
73
Augustinus, De civitate Dei I.1-2.
74
Ibid. XIII 13-17.
75
Ibid. II. 21.
10

Christian fatalism (as regards the terrestrial world), and deferential quietism (as
regards political authority) 76 led Augustine to disparage Cicero’s view that any earthly power can
ever aspire to justice. Where Cicero had embraced political checks and balances, as practical
requisites for justice and state,77Augustine insisted that true justice will never be possible in an earth
on which humanity will always be inescapably polluted by sin.78 If Caesar’s usurpation imposed
servitude on Rome, as Cicero, Sallust, and many others insisted (and Augustine repeated), 79 then
sinful humans would need to embrace a similar servitude to God, to raise themselves from their
fallen condition. Augustine denied that human reason could ever control human vices,

80

and

identified faith, not reason, as the only source of true justice. The pre-Christian Roman republic,
and the infidels (such as Cicero), who inhabited it, deserved (he suggested) their ultimate fate of
complete and utter destruction.81

Augustine’s preference for faith and authority over reason and deliberation became
the guiding principle of European thought in the centuries between the fall of Rome and the
emergence of modernity. Cicero, as the single greatest Roman authority on legal and political ideas,
required detailed refutation, to make this new dispensation possible. Thus the careful arguments
made against Cicero by Christian apologists had the paradoxical effect of preserving some of his
most important ideas for posterity. Augustine, immortalized Cicero’s definition of a “res publica”

76

Cf. Matthew, 22:21.
E.g. M. Tullius Cicero, De re publica, II.42.69.
78
Augustinus, XIX.15.
79
See Augustinus, De civitate Dei, II.18-19 quoting a fragment from Sallust’s Histories (1.11).
80
Augustinus, De civitate Dei, XIX.21.
81
Citing Exodus 22:20.
77
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as “res populi,” 82 in which the people share a sense of justice and commitment to the common good
of society as a whole. 83 Augustine did so in order to demonstrate that there can be no republic
without the dominion of God.84 He wanted to subordinate reason to God, but in so doing Saint
Augustine preserved Cicero’s encomium on reason, where future generations could find it.

4.

Cicero the Revolutionary

When Patrick Henry stood before the Virginia Convention in March, 1775, to assert the
rights of Americans against their king, he said that there was just one light by which his feet would
be guided, “the lamp of experience.” Henry knew, he said, “no way of judging the future but by the
past”85 and an essential part of Virginia’s past, for Henry as for his audience, was their own
childhood reading of Cicero’s orations, and particularly of his orations against Catiline and the
Philippics.86 So Henry concluded his own Philippic against George III with words that recalled the
Cicero’s defiance of Antony: “Give me liberty or give me death.” 87 The analogy was not a new
one: “Caesar had his Brutus,” Henry had threatened ten years earlier, “Charles had his

82

Augustinus, De civitate Dei, XIX.21.
M. Tullius Cicero, De re publica, I.25.39: “res publica res populi, populus autem non omnis
hominum coetus quoquo modo congregatus, sed coetus multitudinis iuris consensu et utilitatis
communione sociatus.”
84
Augustinus, De civitate Dei, XIX.21.
85
Patrick Henry, in the Second Virginia Convention, Richmond, March 23, 1775.
86
On the importance of Cicero in the American Colonial curriculum, see Meyer Reinhold, Classica
Americana: The Greek and Roman Heritage in the United States (Detroit, 1984), and ibid., The
Classick Pages: Classical Readings of Eighteenth-Century Americans (University Park,
Pennsylvania, 1975). Cf. Richard M. Gummere, The American Colonial Mind and the Classical
Tradition (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1963), pp. 55ff.
87
Patrick Henry, in the Second Virginia Convention, Richmond, March 23, 1775. Cf. M. Tullius
Cicero, Philippicae, VIII.10.29: “aut libertas parata victori est aut mors proposita victo.”
83

12

Cromwell…and George the third may profit by their examples.” 88 Henry saw his own fight for
liberty as part of a centuries-old tradition of resistance to tyranny, that began with Cicero and
Rome. 89

Many of the leaders of the revolutions that turned the world towards reason and modernity
in politics were lawyers, like Patrick Henry, who took Cicero as their personal model. Johan van
Oldenbarnevelt and Hugo Grotius in the Netherlands, John Hampden and John Pym in England,
John Adams and Thomas Jefferson in the United States, Camille Desmoulins and Pierre Vergniaud
in France, were all lawyers who risked their lives to challenge arbitrary authority (or perceived
themselves to be doing so), as Cicero had risked his life against Julius Caesar and Marcus Antonius
in Rome. Desmoulins explained in his “Secret History” of the Revolution, how the French first
learned to love liberty and hate despotism by reading Cicero at school. “They brought us up in the
schools of Rome and Athens,” he complained, “to live under Claudius and Vitellius.” Admiring the
Roman past, young men had courage to hope for change in the present – and to risk their lives to
achieve it.90

Henry’s posturing and Desmoulins’ recollections confirm how important Cicero’s direct
influence could be on lawyers and other educated persons. Cicero (like Aristotle, Sallust and to
some extent Tacitus) had been present in the schools and universities for centuries, and therefore
moderated by subsequent interpretation, but each generation also had direct access to ancient

88

Patrick Henry, in the Virginia House of Burgesses, May 29, 1765, in the debate about the Stamp
Act Resolutions.
89
See William Wirt, The Life and Character of Patrick Henry (Philadelphia, 1836), p. 54.
90
Camille Desmoulins, Histoire des Brissotins ou Fragment de l’histoire secrète de la révolution et
des six premiers mois de la République (Paris, 1793).
13

authors, and could learn from their writings without mediation. This became increasingly true with
each passing century, as more works of Cicero and his contemporaries were discovered, more were
translated, and as the printing press and growing prosperity increased the numbers of Europeans
with access to ancient learning. Many still believed, with Tacitus, that limited government under a
balanced constitution, while admirable, was unrealistic, and almost impossible to maintain. 91
Cicero’s orations held out a more hopeful model, that arbitrary authority could be checked and
controlled by eloquence, reason, and constitutional design, encouraging the vigilance and natural
love of liberty of a united people. 92

Cicero died a horrible death, his hands and head cut off and nailed to the rostrum by the
servants of Octavian and Marcus Antonius, as Plutarch recounted the story, to punish him for his
Philippics.93 Many of Cicero’s successors and imitators would suffer or even embrace a similar fate.
Madame Roland, who, as the young Manon Phlipon smuggled her copy of Plutarch into church
instead of a prayer-book, 94 was executed by decapitation. So were Camille Desmoulins, Pierre
Vergniaud, and many others who opposed the tyranny of Robespierre 95 Vergniaud wrote with his
blood on the walls of his prison: “Potius mori quam foedari.” Like Henry, he preferred an honest
death to life under despotism. 96 Algernon Sidney was also decapitated for his writings, which

91

C. Tacitus, Annali, 4.33: “Nam cunctas nations et urbes populus aut primores aut singuli regunt:
delecta ex iis et consociata rei publicae forma laudari facilius quam evenire vel si evenit, haud
diuturna esse potest.”
92
M. Tullius Cicero, In Catilinam, 4.15-16. Cf. 2.25.
93
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began by invoking Cicero, 97as also was Henry Vane, who “sealed” his service to the
commonwealth “with blood.”98 “A better senator” was John Milton wrote, “ne’er held the helm of
Rome.”99 Even careful Oldenbarnevelt was beheaded in the end, for the threat his principles posed
to arbitrary authority. 100

Not all those who died for the “old cause” 101 of law, reason, and constitutional
government102 deliberately chose to share the fate of Cicero, but all knew the dangers of provoking
arbitrary authority, and persevered regardless. Cicero of the Philippics and orations against Catiline
was just as important for the development of European law and government as the Cicero who
wrote more measured treatises on laws and duties, because the forceful and defiant lawyer gave a
model not only of eloquence but of action. 103 The life and speeches of Cicero taught European
lawyers and politicians not to fear death too much to fight for reason, that glory comes also to those
who defend the law, that constitutional government is worth the struggle, and that arms and power
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may ultimately give way to reason and to the just procedures of a well-constructed legal system.
“Cedant arma togae” remained the rallying cry of modern European law. 104

The modern appeal to reason and the rule of law against arbitrary authority faced two main
antagonists in many centuries between the death of Cicero and the European revolutions. First,
claims to absolute authority by the emperors (and later kings) and second, claims to absolute
authority by the Popes (and later Protestant divines). Pretensions to complete civil and religious
control became separated to some extent in western Europe, and sometimes came into conflict,
which opened a space into which direct appeals to reason, justice and balanced institutions could
insert themselves. Religious leaders found it useful to support checks and balances against political
power. Magistrates supported checks and balances against religious authority. And after the
Protestant reformation, during the wars of religion, dissenters from the governing faction in every
state and principality (irrespective of religion) had good reason to resist the arbitrary power of their
rulers. 105

5.

The Seeds of Modernity

Marcus Tullius Cicero was an admirer of Aristotle106 and in fundamental agreement with
him on many important points of ethics, law, and politics. 107 Aristotle, like Cicero placed great
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importance on reason, the rule of law, 108 a common-good conception of justice, 109 and the study of
public institutions.110 This raises the question why Cicero’s influence on modernity was so much
greater than that of his models. Partly this was because Cicero wrote in graceful Latin, which made
him more accessible to the Latin West, but the translation and reintroduction of many of Aristotle’s
works into Western European discourse blunted this difference and led to a great awakening of
learning, culminating in the writings of Thomas Aquinas and his followers. Aquinas sought to
reconcile law, reason, and Christianity, by separating eternal law, natural law, human law and
divine law,111 and granting that natural law is accessible to reason. 112 This had the effect of
preserving divine authority and therefore the authority of the Church, while accepting the value of
reason and temporal justice in most earthly affairs. 113

The widespread reception of Aristotle into Christian circles, his interpretation by Aquinas,
and the manipulation of his vocabulary by judicious translation, had the salutary effect of
strengthening (on the theoretical level) the commitment of Christian Europe to laws founded on
reason for the common good. At the same time, Christian submission to constituted authority, both
civil and ecclesiastical, muted the practical effect of this revival of ancient learning, obscured
Aristotle’s commonalities with Cicero, and limited scholarly attention to the practical questions of
constitutional architecture that might have been raised (for example) by Aristotle’s Politics. So
great was the assimilation of Aristotle’s work to prevailing orthodoxy during this pre-modern
107
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period, that the rise of humanism appeared to many as the triumph of Ciceronian rhetoricians
against retrograde Aristotelian scholastics. 114 This antithesis only finally broke down with
Leonardo Bruni’s new translations of the Ethics and Politics into Ciceronian Latin in the early
fifteenth century.115

The turbulent circumstances of political life in Italy brought Bruni and others to consider the
science of politics more carefully, and inaugurated a period of Florentine speculation that
culminated in the writings of Niccolò Machiavelli. 116 Later proponents of modern political science
would credit Machiavelli with having been “the first who revived the ancient politics.” 117 This
cannot have been entirely true in a Europe which had been reading Cicero and Aristotle for
centuries, but there does seem to have been a quantitive change at the beginning of the sixteenth
century. 118 Machiavelli’s Discorsi sopra la prima deca di Tito Livio inaugurated a new
conversation about how well-structured legal institutions might make men, if not good, at least
useful to themselves and to society. 119
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When proponents of modern political science set out in the late eighteenth century to furnish
examples of the “reading and reasoning” which inspired constitutional government, 120 they began
with Cicero, 121 supported by excerpts from Tacitus, 122 Aristotle, 123 Polybius, 124 and Livy, 125 but
then there was a great leap across the centuries to Machiavelli, concerning how Rome’s
constitutional checks and balances had (through the fortitous intervention of history), gradually
worked their way towards perfection.126 Machiavelli remained a somewhat suspect figure,
discredited by his writings on princes, 127 but students of government took his proposals seriously,
128

including his praise for the republican government of Rome.

129

Machiavelli’s Discorsi on Livy made him to some extent the “great restorer of true politics.”
in Europe,130 but as the author of Il Principe he also vastly strengthened a rival style of
government, based on the absolute power of princes. Machiavelli was frank in recognizing that
princes will do what they must to maintain their power, 131 and this encouraged a secular theory of
absolute power, which threatened the modern rule of law. 132 After the St. Bartholomew’s Day
massacre of August 24, 1572, the French Huguenot Innocent Gentillet did permanent damage to
120

Ibid. at I.xv.
Ibid. at I.xvi-xviii.
122
Ibid. at I.xvi.
123
Ibid. at I.125.
124
Ibid. at I.169 ff.
125
Ibid. at I.125.
126
Ibid. at I.141-147, quoting Niccolo Machiavelli, Discorsi sopra la prima deca di Tito Livio at I.2
and especially I.2.36: “ma rimandendo mista, fece una republica perfetta.”
127
John Adams, Defence of the Constituions of Government of the United States of America
(London, 1787) at I.325.
128
Ibid. at II.241-250.
129
Ibid. at I.147.
130
Ibid. at III.210.
131
See e.g. Niccolò Machiavelli, Il Principe, capitolo VIII.
132
See e.g William Shakespeare The Merry Wives of Windsor (1602), Host: “Am I politic? Am I
subtle? Am I Machiavel?”
121

19

Machiavelli’s reputation by pointing out in his Discours sur les moyens de bien gouverner contre
Nicolas Machiavel the pernicious effects of separating a prince’s interests from those of his
subjects. 133 Having revived the ancient conversation about the science of politics, Machiavelli
damaged his legacy by supplementing his study of liberty with a manual for princes.

6.

134

The Enemies of Liberty

Thomas Hobbes spoke for many in his famous attack on Cicero and Aristotle, when he said
that “by reading of these Greek, and Latine Authors, men from their childhood have gotten a habit
(under a falseshew of Liberty) of favouring tumults, and of licentious controlling the actions of their
Soveraigns; and again of controlling those controllers, with the effusion of so much blood; as I think
I may truly say, there was never anything so deerly bought, as these Western parts have bought the
learning of the Greek and Latine tongues.” 135 Hobbes wrote at the end of a great civil war, which
led him to conclude that “without…Arbitrary government, … Warre must be perpetuall.”
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He

denounced ancient advocates of the rule of law for their “pernicious error” and preferred the
decisive power of rulers able to “kill or hurt” their disobedient subjects. 137 Hobbes supported the
arbitrary power of government, because he feared that “masterlesse men” will always be in
“perpetuall war” with their neighbors. 138
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Hobbes’ reaction to the horrors of the English Civil War is significant for three reasons:
first, because he confirms the great influence of Cicero (and Aristotle) against arbitrary
governments; second, because Hobbes displayed a typical reaction to civil conflict, in his hope for
peace at all costs; and third because Hobbes inaugurates a new stage in the defense of absolute
government against the limitations of reason as applied to law. Conventional apologies for
“absolute monarchy”139 would have relied on divine election as the justification and source of all
public offices.140 The Stuart kings claimed parental authority over their subjects, 141 for which they
declared themselves to be answerable to God alone. 142 But Hobbes’ Leviathan made very little use
of religion in arguing for absolute government, and accepted the ancient starting point of nature in
constructing civil society. Hobbes denigrated most claims of “right reason” as simple assertions of
personal opinion, 143 but still developed his own argument on a scientific basis. 144 Hobbes differs
from Cicero and Aristotle, not in the value that he places on reason, 145 but rather in fearing the
likely consequences of balanced government or “liberty,” when applied to law and political
authority. 146

Like his Christian predecessors, Augustine and Aquinas, Hobbes challenged Cicero’s
influence by subverting his vocabulary. “Liberty” for Cicero, as for most Europeans prior to
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Hobbes, signified subjection to no man, but only to just and equal laws, made for the common good
of society. 147 Hobbes redefined “liberty” as “the absence of externall impediments.” 148 This
meant either that all laws, just and unjust, are violations of liberty, or that none are, 149 but in any
case obscured the difference between free and despotic governments. “Right” and “Wrong,”
“Justice” and “Injustice,” according to Hobbesian definitions, do not exist until there is law, and law
itself does not exist without a dominant power to enforce it. 150 Leviathan relies on the doctrine that
“a kingdom divided in itself cannot stand” to disparage checks and balances in government.151
Hobbes accepted the ancient values of reason and the common good as the ultimate purposes of
government and law, 152 but relied entirely on the will and power of those in authority to secure as
much reason and justice as they saw fit.

Hobbes was unusual among the enemies of liberty and constitutional government in his
limited and eccentric reliance on religious authority.

153

This restricted his immediate influence, but

made him the father of a lasting and powerful school of European absolutists.

154

Hobbes renewed

and revised the old imperial claim that “princeps legibus solutus est,” without making any direct
appeal to supernatural authority. 155 More typical among Hobbes’ contemporaries and immediate
successors was Robert Filmer, whose Patriarcha established the “natural power of Kings” on the
147
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basis of scripture and divine sanction. 156 But otherwise their arguments were very much the same.
Filmer feared the “fickleness” and “dissensions” of popular sovereignty which “shed an ocean of
blood within Italy and the streets of Rome.” 157 He argued that “the cruelty of all the tyrannical
emperors that ever ruled in this city did… [not] spill a quarter of the blood that was poured out in
the last hundred years of her glorious commonwealth.”158 “Tyrants,” at their worst, Filmer argued,
only oppress a few particular unfortunate men, because their self-interest prompts them generally to
support the welfare of their subjects.159

The English Civil War illustrates the great and continuing difficulty of moving from
government by arbitrary power towards government by reason and the rule of law. Those with
power will fight to maintain it, making the simple injustice of despotism seem mild in comparison
to the greater misery of open warfare. Hobbes, Filmer, and Machiavelli sought justice from princes,
knowing they could not expect it, because they feared the consequences of upsetting the established
order. The English Civil War was a watershed of emergent modernity, because it clarified the
central issued of modern law and politics. All sides now conceded that governments should apply
reason to nature to secure the common good of their subjects. What remained in question was how
(or whether) political science could best secure this result. The enemies of liberty drew a line at the
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science of politics. “For forms of government let fools contest; whate’er is best administer’d is
best.”160

7.

The English Revolution

The prominence of Cicero in the European development of rhetoric, in humanism, and in the
renaissance of European culture, set the stage for his influence on modern law,

161

but Cicero’s

impact on European political institutions remained limited, until the breakdown of imperial power
and the wars of religion opened a space for political speculation, and the possibility of political
change. The “Glorious Revolution” of 1688 can be seen on one level as the triumph of a Protestant
people against their Catholic ruler at the tail end of religious reformation of Europe. From another
standpoint, however, the ouster of James II signified the beginning of a new legal era of modern
constitutionalism. The primary complaints of his subjects against the king concerned questions of
constitutional law, and his successors accepted a constitutional settlement, as a condition of their
tenure on the throne. 162

Cicero had argued for checks and balances in government, that could take advantage of
monarchic, aristocratic and democratic elements in public administration to better advance the
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public interest. 163 He wrote of “mixed” (“permixtus”) government, 164 as did Aristotle, 165 and this
had sufficient resonance in England (and elsewhere) 166 that Sir Thomas Smith understood the
government of Elizabeth’s England to be “mixt” in 1565. 167 Even the absolutist monarch King
Charles I of England conceded under pressure that England’s constitution was a “mixture” of
“absolute monarchy, aristocracy and democracy” with a “balance” between the three estates.

168

The innovation that followed England’s revolution was not so much in the idea of “mixture” as it
was in the strengthened role of popular sovereignty, and the “institution” of “popular
commonwealths” that had been so much feared and despised by Thomas Hobbes. 169

Hobbes’ attack on the “specious name of Libertie”170 evoked an immediate response from
James Harrington, whose Commonwealth of Oceana (1656) set out to defend Cicero, Aristotle, and
their “ancient prudence” of government in the public interest 171 against the implications of
Leviathan, which seemed to encourage government in the interest of the rulers, or rather: an
“empire of men and not of laws.” 172 Securing the more desirable “empire of laws and not of
men”173 depended, Harrington suggested, on maintaining a deliberative senate,174 to control (as
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Cicero proposed) the natural intemperance of the comitia.175 Harrington cited Cicero’s criticism of
plebiscites176 but also his insistence that no legislation could be valid, without a vote in the popular
assembly. 177 He disliked the excesses of England’s unicameral Commonwealth Parliament, which
ruled without checks and balances, as much as he feared Hobbes’ despotic absolute monarch.
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Harrington pointed out (correctly) that neither Cicero nor Aristotle would have supported any such
arrangement. 179

The “old cause” of liberty and balanced government that Sidney praised on the scaffold, 180
had been on the boil in England for most of the seventeenth century, fired by theories of law,
government, and the constitution first lit by Cicero and his contemporaries in the last years of
Rome’s liberty, and shortly afterwards.181 Subsequent revolutions in modern law would consult the
tracts of these English disputes alongside Cicero, Sallust, Livy and Tacitus, because the subjectmatter was the same. 182 The question was how best to structure the “right constitution of a
commonwealth” to avoid the “simple monarchy” and “absolute power” imposed by Caesar and his
successors, and embraced by Hobbes. 183
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James Harrington gave a very clear and succinct exposition of reason, law, and government,
as applied to the constitution of England at the height of English interregnum. 184 Harrington
mourned the liberty “extinguished” by the “arms of Caesar.”185 He proposed that magistrates
“should govern according to reason,” secured by careful “mixture” in the constitution of the state.
186

This “doctrine of the ancients” had been developed by the “senatus populusque Romanus”187

according to the principle “censuere patres, jussit populus” described by Cicero. 188 The checks and
balances of a well-constructed government will bring forward “reason in the debate of the
commonwealth,” which is the law. And “if the liberty of a man consist in the empire of his reason,
the absence whereof would betray him unto the bondage of his passions, then the liberty of a
commonwealth consisteth in the empire of her laws, the absence whereof would betray her unto the
lusts of the tyrants.”189 James Harrington considered this “equality of power” to be “the liberty not
only of the commonwealth, but of every man” in it. 190

Cicero and his English successors sought a “common right, law of nature, or interest of the
whole,”191 which is “right reason.”192 More important than recognizing this principle, however, was
to construct such “orders of government” as would constrain the citizens and magistrates to take up
“the common good.”193 English theorists proposed the election of a “Senate,” or second chamber in
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the legislature, with members chosen “for their excellent parts,” not to be “commanders,” but
“counselors” of the people.194 Both Harrington and Sidney endorsed Cicero’s proposal that all
legislation should be approved “auctoritate patrum et jussu populi,” by the authority of the Senate
and order of the people, “which concurring make a law.”195 Both believed, citing Cicero, Plato and
Aristotle, that the only purpose of all public officials “always and everywhere” is to do “justice and
procure the welfare of those that create them.” 196 Both defined law and justice to be, as Sidney put
it (using Cicero’s words), “sanctio recta, jubens, honesta, prohibens contraria.” 197

Algernon Sidney wrote his Discourses to counter the arguments of Filmer and Hobbes, and
to vindicate the value of government that “proportion[ed the powers of several magistracies” so
that “they might all concur in procuring the publick good.” Sidney wanted, like Cicero, to “divide
the powers between the magistrates and people,” so that “ a well-regulated harmony might be
preserved in the whole.” 198 Where Hobbes and Filmer tried to threaten these doctrines of Cicero,
Sidney defended them, 199 arguing that “the Glory, Virtue, and Power of the Romans began and
ended with their liberty.” 200 Once Augustus destroyed the Roman constitution and usurped all law
and justice for himself (“omnium jura in se traxerat”), then liberty was at an end, and the era of
“miserable slavery” began. 201 Sidney suggested that “Roman greatness” justified a close attention
to “what passed among them, “ but only as to “what they did, said, or thought when they enjoyed
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that liberty which was the mother and nurse of their virtue,” and “the laws were more powerful than
the commands of men.”202

Filmer’s arguments against the rule of law and constitutional government had been primarily
religious, and so were many elements of Algernon Sidney’s response. Sidney compared James II to
the French royal house of Valois (which had slaughtered the Protestants of France), to Philip II of
Spain (who had slaughtered the Protestants of the Netherlands), and to the “sweetness and
apostolical meekness of the Inquistion” (which made a general practice of slaughter). 203 This
reflected the religious, as well as the political, nature of the struggle. John Locke, who also wrote in
response to Filmer, divided his argument into two books, the first of which rested almost entirely on
the Bible. 204 Locke too opposed the “slavery” 205 of “abolute power”206 with “reason,” (presented as
the “Voice of God” in man.)207 Like Cicero, Aristotle, and Sidney, Locke identified the only
purpose of political power as the “Publick Good”208 and sought the public good through “Reason,”
which is the “Law of Nature.” 209

John Locke was a partisan of “our great Restorer,” King William III, 210 which inhibited his
precision about the details of constitutional government, 211 beyond his flat opposition to “Arbitrary
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Power”212 and commitment to the sovereignty of the people.213 The Glorious Revolution
established both of these principles, and their basis in “the Foundation and End of all Laws,” which
is “the publick good,”214 but could not shake the power of regnum215 or the continuing importance
of religious conformity. William and Mary invaded England “to save the Protestant religion,” 216
and the “Declaration of Rights” which confirmed their succession concerned the safety of “the
Protestant” religion as much as it did “the laws and liberties” of the Kingdom217 Thus although the
rhetoric and result of the English Revolution very much advanced the cause of reason and balanced
government in law, the English still had one foot in the premodern world of royalty and religious
authority.

8.

Reason, Religion, and the Law

The final steps towards modernity in European law and government took place, not so much
in the “Glorious” Revolution itself, 218 as in its echoes and memory across Europe. The baron de
Montesquieu, for example, admired the English of his time as “un peuple libre,” formed by the
principles of their constitution, which helped to shape the mores, manners, and character of the
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nation. 219 The English Revolution had only positive effects “car les révolutions que forme la
liberté ne sont qu’une confirmation de la liberté.” 220 People living under such a constitution will
love their liberty, Montesquieu believed “parce que cette liberté serait vraie.”221 All citizens should
have this freedom to think for themselves about religion, to embrace the faith of their choice, or
none, and to be untroubled in their lives and goods and politics by the public involvement of
religious authority. 222

Montesquieu’s attitude towards law and religion, which he attributed to the English,
reflected his early reading of Cicero, as it did among the English themselves. James Harrington
insisted on liberty of conscience, citing Cicero’s “most excellent book,” De natura deorum.223
Montesquieu wrote that he too had read these pages of Cicero with pleasure, because they
confounded the pretentions of all sects equally, without favoritism.

224

Cicero was, for

Montesquieu, among all the ancients, the one with the greatest personal merit, “et à qui j’aimerois
mieux ressembler.”225 Reading Cicero inspired Montesquieu to eloquence and emulation of the
great “libérateur de la patrie” and “défenseur de la liberté,”226 who made philosophy, like reason,
available to everyone. 227 Cicero formed our morals, Montesquieu reported, and showed us our duty
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to follow reason, without passion, despite the threat of certain death. 228 “Nous leur devons ces
beaux ouvrages qui seront admirés par toutes les sectes et dans toutes les révolutions de la
philosophie.”229

Roman policies concerning religion differed from those of other nations, as Montesquieu
explained it, because the Romans had designed their religion to serve the state, and not their state to
serve religion. 230 Religion had no voice in public affairs, without permission of the magistrates, 231
and religious questions were settled by considering the public good. 232 By subordinating religious
institutions to the public welfare (Montesquieu suggested), the Romans had succeeded in preventing
“superstition” from oppressing the republic. 233 Montesquieu did not disparage or oppose religion
any more than Cicero had, but wanted religion to serve the public good. 234 The aim in religious
institutions, as in all other constitutional arrangements, should be civic harmony, “qui fait que toutes
les parties, quelques opposées qu’elles nous paraissent, concourent au bien général de la sociéte
comme des dissonances dans la musique concourent à l’accord total.” 235
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Montesquieu’s conceptions of law, politics, religion and government followed and often
paraphrased Cicero in seeking to apply reason, not only to the laws themselves, but to the structures
that create and maintain the laws, through the checks and balances of constitutional
government. 236 Montesquieu did not seek (as some had) “l’accord du despotisme asiatique,” 237 but
rather the balanced concord of divided public powers, which check, control, and support each other.
238

As soon as Romans changed their institutions, Rome failed, because the Romans had abandoned

the principles that had made Rome strong.239 When the Christian emperors tried to strengthen the
faith by coercion, they simply weakend the state, to the detriment of all citizens and ultimate ruin of
their nation. 240

Cicero’s dialogue de natura deorum made the radical argument that justice has nothing to do
with divinity, but only with the needs of human society and the community of mankind. 241 The
gods will not step in to regulate the world, 242 and right and wrong are right and wrong in
themselves, without need for gods make them so.243 Cicero suggested (through the character of
Cotta) that the nature of divinity is necessarily obscure, 244despite its obvious utility in encouraging
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good behavior. 245 Thus Hugo Grotius’ famous statement that the basic principles of reason, law,
and justice would remain the same, “etiamsi daremus” there was no God at all. 246 Removing
religious authority from government cast the responsibility for justice back onto reason, and to the
guidance of whatever constitutional structure would best control and motivate the public powers to
secure the common good of all those subject to the law. 247

9.

The American Revolution

Cicero was primarily a lawyer, a politician, and a philosopher of law. His influence and
authority arose, not from force of arms or military power, but from the force of argument and
persuasion. With the growth of learning in Europe, the class of such men became larger. Johan van
Oldenbarnevelt and Hugo Grotius set an example as political lawyers in the States of Holland that
John Hampden and John Pym elaborated in England’s Parliament, but always in the shadow of
monarchy and religion. At the end of the seventeenth century Johan de Witt and Algernon Sideny
still found themselves fighting a losing battle for Cicero’s legal and constitutional ideals against
latter-day Caesars in the Netherlands and Great Britain.
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did European legal modernism finally shake off the shackles of the intervening centuries, to
approach ideals that Cicero had advanced at the end of the liberty of Rome.

249

The triumph of Western legal modernism came first, not in the center of the European
world, but on its extreme periphery, along the eastern littoral of British North America. American
lawyers were products of the Glorious Revolution, but without the royal presence or the uniformity
in religion that constrained their British contemporaries. James Trenchard and Thomas Gordon,
writing as “Cato” in England had summarized the Whig consensus of their era, praising the
principles of Cicero, and mourning the loss of his Republic. 250 “Cato” translated, quoted, and
commented on correspondence of Cicero and Brutus, because “the same Principles of Nature and
Reason that supported Liberty at Rome, must support it here and everywhere.” Trenchard and
Gordon knew that “the foundations of tyranny are in all countries, and at all times, essentially the
same; namely…power without a balance.” 251 But even Trenchard and Gordon felt it necessary to
confirm their subservience to the King. 252 Americans could aspire to the eloquence, principles, and
policies of Cicero without sharing so immediately their English cousins’ fear of punishment by the
hereditary powers of the state. 253
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American attitudes were steeped in the same classical readings and values as the British,
“Cato,” but in a much purer and unadulterated form, because their libraries were smaller.
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British

colonists were jealous of their liberty, when they considered it threatened, and defended themselves
with legal, constitutional, and classical arguments, in conscious imitation of Cicero. 255 Dr. Joseph
Warren, the first great martyr of the American Revolution, killed at Bunker Hill in 1775, wore a
“Ciceronian toga” into Old South Meetinghouse in Boston to declaim against the king,
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and

James Otis rested his argument for American rights (in 1764) on Cicero’s theory that “the
superstructures and the whole administration [of government] should be conformed to the law of
universall reason.”257 Otis argued that Britain’s balanced constitution gave Britons the world’s best
form of government since the usurpation of Caesar, destroyed “the Roman glory and grandeur,” but
that British politicians, like Caesar, had subverted the balance of government, and undermined the
legitimacy of the state. 258

The American Revolution from the beginning opposed “kingcraft” and “priestcraft” (as Otis
explained it), because arbitrary political or religious authority was inimical to “government [for] the

that brought one of their monarchs to the block, and struck another from his throne. It was the
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good of mankind.”259 Americans followed Cicero making the “law of nature and of reason” their
final measure of the state. 260 After the Declaration of Independence in 1776 they needed new
forms of government to replace the discredited structures of colonial role. Cicero provided a name
(“republic”), a goal (“liberty”), and a technique (checks and balances) for the new American
constitutions. John Adams promoted this template for the American state governments in a letter to
Richard Henry Lee, published as Thoughts on Government in 1776, in which he insisted that “there
is no good government but what is republican.” Adams defined a republic as a “government of
laws and not of men,” arguing that whatever form of government best secures just and impartial
laws, deserved to be established in the states. Adams suggested a bicameral government with a
popular assembly, as in Rome, controlled by a second legislative chamber (the “Senate”) and an
elected executive. 261 “We shall learn to prize the checks and balances of a free government”
(Adams later explained) “if we recollect the miseries…which arose” from trying to live without
them. 262

The leaders of the American Revolution (and many of their supporters throughout Europe
and elsewhere) believed that in their new constitutions the “theory and practice of government” had
finally met and surpassed the standards set by the ancients, in the same way that other “arts and
“sciences” in general had progressed “during the three or four last centuries.”263 The “knowledge of
the principles and construction of free government” had been (many believed) nearly at a standstill
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for two thousand years.264 Modern students of government confirmed the value of a “Senate” of
the most “able” citizens as a “check to ministers, and a security against abuses,” 265 they understood
the necessity of an assembly of representatives chosen by the people, to communicate “the wishes
of the nation,”266 and they endorsed the benefits of balancing both with a strong and independent
elected executive power.267 John Adams claimed that “the United States of America have
exhibited, perhaps, the first example of governments erected on the simple principles of nature: and
if men are now sufficiently enlightened to disabuse themselves of artifice, imposture, hypocrisy,
and superstition, they will consider this event as an aera in their history.” 268

For Americans “the use of reason” in securing justice and the common good of the
people required them to view legislation in the same light as other “ordinary arts and sciences, only
…of more importance.”269 As wise architects consult “Vitruvio, Palladio, and all other writers of
reputation in the art,”270 so students of constitutional government put aside the “monkery of priests,
or the knavery of politicians” 271 to look to Cicero and Tacitus, 272 perhaps to Polybius,273 but
certainly not to the monarchical despotism of Europe274 or the unbalanced unicameralism of
primitive Germany275 that had resulted in “the widespread miseries and final slavery of almost all
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mankind.”276 John Adams described the systems devised by legislators through the ages as
“experiments” made on human life and manners. 277 Rome and England provided the favorite
models for modern constitution-writers278 and Cicero the greatest guidance, when he said that “the
laws, which are the only possible rule, measure and security of justice” can be just and protected
only under the checks and balances of a democratic republic, with two branches in the legislature,
and an elected executive power. 279

Americans engaged in the pseudonymous newspaper debates that heralded their Revolution
presented themselves as “Publius,” “Publicola,” “Junius,” “Brutus,” “Cato,” “Cincinnatus,”
“Tullius,” “Cicero” and the like because they saw their challenges as essentially the same as those
that had threatened the justice and stability of Rome:280 how to protect law, liberty, and the balanced
constitution against the twin incursions of monarchy (leading to tyranny) on the one hand, and
democracy (leading to anarchy) on the other. 281 Eleven of the newly independent American states
would adopt new constitutions between 1776 and 1780 and each constitution was more elaborate
and carefully thought-out than the last. Of these, Virginia, Maryland, North Carolina, New York,
South Carolina, and Massachusetts all had a “Senate,” and the other state legislatures were also
bicameral, with the exception of Pennsylvania and Georgia, which added senates later to bring
themselves into line with the rest. 282
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When the newly independent American states finally perpetuated their union under a
new federal Constitution in 1789, they adapted many of its most important attributes from the
republican reforms proposed by Cicero for Rome. There was an elected “Senate,” sitting on the
“Capitol” hill, above the “Tiber” river,283 with a second democratic chamber to express the will of
the people, and an elected first magistrate. The chief executive could not act, in many instances,
without the “advice and consent” of the Senate,284 and the document as a whole sought to secure the
“Liberty” of the American people.285 George Washington, in assuming his duties as the first
President of the United State, declared that “the preservation of the sacred fire of liberty, and the
destiny of the republican model of the government, are justly considered as deeply, perhaps finally,
staked on the experiment entrusted to the American People.”286

10.

The French Revolution

The French Revolution was the turning point in political and legal modernity, when the
Ciceronian principles of law and government through reason finally escaped their ancient context,
to overturn the politics of Europe. 287 This meant that the French Revolution was also the last great
political event to take its inspiration, iconography and institutions primarily from classical
283
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antiquity. 288 Like the Americans, English, Italians, and Dutch, French revolutionaries depended on
the ancient world for legal and political ideals, and the courage to apply them in practice.289
Classicism had been sapping the foundations of French absolutism for more than a century before
the people of Paris finally stormed the Bastille in 1789.290 Camille Desmoulins, whose fiery
rhetoric (according to his own account) precipitated the uprising of July 14, attributed the strike
against despotism to the same sentiments that inspired patriotic reaction against Caesar at the end of
Republican Rome.291

Cicero played an important role in the rhetoric and ideals of the French Revolution, as he
had in the United States, but not without rivals. 292 Gabriel Bonnot de Mably wrote influential
Observations sur les Romains (1751), but also Entretiens de Phocion (1763) and Observations sur
l’histoire de la Grèce (1766). French attitudes towards antiquity idealised Cicero and the Roman
republic,293 but also Sparta and sometimes Athens, 294 dividing French revolutionary ideology into
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two main tendencies, partially anticipated by Montesquieu and Rousseau.295 While the followers of
Cicero emphasized the checks and balances of republican government and the rule of law, 296
admirers of Greece stressed the necessity of virtue and the importance of popular sovereignty.

297

Neither set of views directly contradicted the other, and most French revolutionaries would have
found both somewhat congenial, but Rousseau and Mably cultivated a Spartan sensibility that could
be somewhat at odds with Cicero’s legal program of complicated checks and balances to control the
assemblies and magistrates of Rome. 298

Mably and Jacques Turgot advocated simple assemblies, like the British Long Parliament,
which contradicted Cicero’s complicated theory of “harmony” in government.299 The National
Constituent Assembly embraced Cicero’s political agenda of the rule of law (“imperium legum”),
popular sovereignty (“imperium populi”), and natural justice (“ius naturale”), embodied in the new
French Declaration of Rights.300 But the French delegates would not accept a senate as proposed by
the Assembly’s constitutional committee under Jean-Joseph Mounier and the comte de Mirabeau. 301
The French Constitution of 1791 established a single National Assembly and vested executive
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power in the King. 302 This relic of regnum could not and did not last among a people fired with the
recollection of Rome. If Cicero could kill Catiline to save the republic, if Cincinnatus could kill
Maelius and Brutus could kill Caesar, why should not the Convention act just as firmly to save
France? The death of Louis Capet inaugurated a lawless Terror more in keeping with the policies of
Antony and Augustus than Cicero’s visions of “concordia” and “harmonia” in Rome. 303

Maximilien Robespierre and Louis de Saint-Just, who presided over the French
proscriptions, both embraced the Spartan view of law and government. Saint-Just explained in
describing the Esprit de la Révolution et de la Constitution de France (1791) that free government
was practically impossible, once virtue had decayed.304 Where Cicero, Polybius, Montesquieu and
Adams studied the checks and balances through which “ambition” could be harnessed to protect the
public good,305 the “Jacobin” party of Saint-Just and Robespierre attempted to purify the people,
through a strict Laconian system of education, and strong government action to root out any
“corruption” among the people or the state.306 The violence of this Jacobin ascendancy shocked
public opinion and confirmed the wisdom of neo-Roman checks and balances. The Constitution of
the Year III included a senate of “Anciens,” to balance the popular assembly, and even a plural
executive, as in Rome. 307 Once again Cicero was in vogue.308 Critics mocked the commissioners
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for speaking so incessantly about Rome,309 but advocates of the Constitution clearly expected their
language to be persuasive.

As Cicero fell before Augustus, so the French Republic succumbed to Napoléon Bonaparte
by degrees, in a series of extra-constitutional manoeuvers, making Bonaparte “first consul” in the
Constitution of the year VIII, then “Consul for Life” (pursuant to a “senatus consulte”, and finally
in the Constitution of the Year XII, the hereditary “emperor” of France. Throughout all these
changes the “senate” and the “tribunate” survived, as they had in Rome of the emperors, but without
much power to influence affairs.310 The Revolution had run its full course, from Brutus to Domitian
in less than fifteen years. The lessons and partisans of Cicero fell before the new empire in much
the same way and for much the same reasons that Cicero himself had failed, because he could not
control the army. But the primary legacy of the Revolution was to reaffirm the principles of the rule
of law and government for the common good, which even Napoléon purported to maintain. 311 The
question of constitutional design was now open for discussion and for scientific inquiry, all across
the continent of Europe.312
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The violence of the French Revolution, and its collapse into despotism, opened a schism in
modernity between the partisans of Cicero, Montesquieu, and the balances of constitutional
government on the one hand, and the partisans of Cato, Rousseau, and the direct rule of virtue on
the other. 313 Robespierre made the same mistake in France that the Stuarts had made in England,
replacing the political reason of law in the state with his own private “reason,” which was (as it
would be for any individual), excitable, self-serving and prone to mistakes. By ignoring the checks
and balances proposed by Cicero, Robespierre first, and then Bonaparte, replaced the measured
laws of constitutional government, with their own personal perceptions of justice . Almost all
parties now recognized truth, reason, and the common good of the people as the ultimate
justification and source of legitimacy in the state, but many in positions of political power still
resisted the humility of constitutionalism, deliberation and social consensus, endorsed by Cicero for
Rome.

11.

The Triumph of Modernity

Marcus Tullius Cicero differed from Tacitus and from most of his other literary and political
successors not in his devotion to liberty, reason and balanced government, but in his persistent
expectation that such values could prevail, despite the frailties of human nature. Cicero presented
the science of law and government as the search for truth about justice, but he also recognized, and
insisted upon, the imperfect, incomplete and fallible nature of human understanding.
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the field of religion Cicero condemned the absurdities of dogmatism, in the face of limited
knowledge, 315 so too in law and politics he endorsed the search for truth and the approximation of
truth, against bare assertions of truth or bald demands for obedience. 316 Thus Cicero sought law in
conformity with reason, despite the selfish tendency of human passions, and advocated a balanced
(“republican”) constitution, as the ultimate arbiter of reason in politics. The triumph of this attitude
many centuries after Cicero’s death marked the final emergence of modern law in Europe.

Modernity abhors arbitrary authority and Cicero offered Europeans an inspiring ideal of
reason as the basis for law in practice. Cicero’s legacy stood for three principles in subsequent
European law and politics, against emperors, prelates, and would-be princes or dictators, for two
thousand years. First, true law is “recta ratio, jubens honesta et prohibens contraria;” second, law
exists to serve the common and collective good of all those subject to its rule; but third and
decisively important in the emergence of modern law and politics, Cicero argued that the
requirements of law and justice emerge most clearly, through the checks and balances of a
“moderatus” and “permixtus” form of government. “Regnum” or the unchecked authority of any
single person, or of a faction of the people, or even of the majority of the people, was tyranny to
Cicero, but also deeply antithetical to the principles of modern law and justice, because unchecked
power becomes unreasonable power, without the guidance of other powers to control it.

Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Robespierre seem “modern” in many respects, including their
devotion to reason and opposition to the pretensions of the clergy, but their doctrines tended to
perpetuate the premodern notion that “princeps legibus solutus est.” All three merit attention, but
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obstructed in varying degrees the emergence of the measured constitutionalism of balanced rights
and duties that distinguishes modern law. The precocious modernity of Cicero is most evident in
the extent to which his commitment to constitutional design surpassed his most perceptive
successors. Modern lawyers trying to improve the legal institutions of their age found Cicero more
useful, not only than enemies of liberty, such as Thomas Hobbes, but even than such heroes of
“liberty and the rights of mankind” as John Locke, 317 John Milton, 318 and David Hume.319

Reviewing Cicero’s influence on European law from his death until the nineteenth century
reveals the history of his constant importance, from the moment his head and hands hung rotting in
the forum. The Roman emperors themselves never denied Cicero’s fundamental premise that law
rests on the common good of the people, even as the memory of Cicero and his strictures on regnum
stood as a constant rebuke to the legitimacy of their rule. The growing power of the clergy supplied
a basis for challenges to civil authority, providing arguments that others turned against the clerics
themselves. First in Italy, then the Low Countries, England, France and all across Europe, lawyers,
scholars and politicians turned to Cicero to imagine a world ruled by reason, without the slavery of
arbitrary authority.
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It would be hard to justify Hume as belonging among the heroes of liberty, but Hume did possess
a very clearsighted and “modern” sensibility in almost all other aspects of his thought (and a
profound respect for Cicero). Hume’s musings about government, however, despite his usual
perspicacity, struck John Adams as tending towards “a complicated aristocracy” that would “soon
behave like all other aristocracies.” Ibid. at I.370. Adams also had some interesting observations on
the constitutional proposals of Sir Thomas More, whose writings he valued as highly as Plato’s
Republic, which is to say, both seemed to him to be “as wild as the ravings of Bedlam.” Ibid. at
I.365.
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Successful revolutions usually begin as appeals to the past. Humans lack the imagination to
consider, and the courage to attempt, dramatic innovations in law and society. Most changes
happen incrementally, as they should, in the gradual evolution of principles and practices to the
varying circumstances of the world. Cicero well understood and eloquently described two constant
tendencies, implanted in human nature, that drive this evolution of the law. First, the desire for
justice, applied to every member of society. Second, the desire for self-serving power, present in
every human being. Cicero died protecting the first against the second, with considerable success,
and even in death his writings and his memory survived. Modern lawyers would not have dared to
challenge kings and princes, or to implement constitutional government in Europe, were it not for
the example set by Cicero in Rome.

The defining characteristics of modern law and government include the appeal to reason, the
limitation of arbitrary power, and commitment to the welfare of the people as a whole. All three
were present in Cicero. All three were rare after Caesar. All three remain precarious today. The
modern age of law and politics began as lawyers, scholars, and politicians started to understand, to
emulate, and eventually sometimes to surpass Cicero. “Postmodern” legalism begins when reason,
deliberation, and constitutional checks and balances lose their hold on lawyers, judges, and others in
positions of public responsibility. The eloquence, example, and insight of Cicero have guided the
development of law in Europe for centuries. So long as his memory survives, the presumptions of
privilege and tyranny will never be entirely secure. “Cedant arma togae, concedat laurea laudi!”320
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